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Abstract
This article examines the changing association between higher education and report-
ing no religious affiliation in the United States. I argue that increases in higher edu-
cation have led to a decline in the individual-level effect of college education on reli-
gious non-affiliation. Results from hierarchical age-period-cohort models using more 
than three and a half decades of repeated cross-sectional sur vey data demonstrate 
that the strong, positive effect of college education on reporti ng no religious affilia-
tion declines precipitously across birth cohorts. Specifically, a bachelor’s degree has 
no effect on non-affiliation by the 1965–69 cohort, and a nega tive effect for the 1970s 
cohorts. Moreover, these across-cohort changes are strongly associated with aggre-
gate growth in college education, and they vary considerably by religious origin. I con-
clude with a discussion of how the results relate to changes among the college-ed-
ucated population, the religious deinstitutionalization of the non-college-educated, 
cultural diffusion across social statuses, and other cohort-appropriate social and cul-
tural changes. 
The assumption that education is a motivating force behind secularization has 
been integral to sociology since Comte, Durkheim, and Weber, and it remains 
ingrained in modern sociology (e.g., Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; Wilson 
1982). College or university education, in particular, is seen as a primary cause 
of secularization (Beckwith 1985; Halman and Draulans 2006; Stark 1963), lead-
ing the highly educated to be disproportionately likely to disaffiliate from orga-
nized religion (Baker and Smith 2009; Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977; Kosmin and 
Keysar 2009). In support of this view, recent trends in the United States include 
both increases in college education and increases in religious non-affiliation 
(Schwadel 2010; US Census Bureau 2007). The proportion of Americans report-
ing no religious affiliation doubled in the 1990s alone, and researchers suggest 
that rising levels of education are one cause of this growth in religious non-affil-
iation (e.g., Hout and Fischer 2002). Increases in religious non-affiliation may be 
indicative that widespread secularization has taken root in US culture (Marwell 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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and Demerath 2003). That highly educated Americans are disproportionately 
likely to be religiously unaffiliated—to manifest this form of secularization—is 
largely unquestioned.
In contrast, I argue that religious disaffiliation and non-affiliation may in-
deed be associated with aggregate increases in education, but that at the individ-
ual level of analysis the positive effect of higher education on religious non-affil-
iation has declined across generations, and this intergenerational decline should 
be associ ated with aggregate increases in higher education. This proposition is 
predicated on intergenerational transformations in the college-educated and non-
college-educated populations, as well as the process of cultural diffusion across 
social statuses. With regard to changes among the college-educated, the disrup-
tion of social networks associated with higher education, which increase the 
likelihood of religious non-affiliation (Baker and Smith 2009; Maryl and Uecker 
2011), should be less relevant in birth cohorts where large proportions of con-
temporaries have at least some college education. Similarly, the ability of higher 
education to act as a proxy for cultural capital, leading the highly educated to 
be disproportionately predisposed to non-affiliation (Wilson and Sherkat 1994; 
Wuthnow and Mellinger 1978), should be less relevant in birth cohorts with rel-
atively high levels of educa tion. With regard to the non-college-educated, the re-
cent religious deinstitutional ization of non-college-educated Americans (Wilcox 
et al. 2012) suggests increases in religious disaffiliation among the less educated 
in particular. Finally, cultural diffusion research shows that the highly educated 
are often “early adaptors” and even “innovators” of new beliefs and behaviors 
(Rogers 2003), but that novel ways of believing and behaving then diffuse to less-
educated segments of the population (Palloni 2001; Pampel and Hunter 2012), 
and this process manifests across genera tions (Edmunds and Turner 2002). Thus, 
the positive effect of higher education on religious disaffiliation should decline 
across generations, and higher education may even be negatively associated with 
religious disaffiliation in younger generations.
At the same time, growth in higher education is accompanied by an array of 
social and cultural changes that are associated with greater levels of religious dis-
affiliation. Increases in college education lead to rising levels of political toler ance 
(Schwadel and Garneau 2014), support for diverse viewpoints (Williams, Nunn, 
and Peter 1976), and declines in religious authority (Balswick, Ward, and Carl-
son 1975). These cultural changes promote a social context that is more condu-
cive to secular lifestyles, regardless of an individual’s level of education. Thus, in 
the aggregate, increases in higher education and religious disaffiliation should be 
strongly correlated.
In this article, I propose that aggregate growth in higher education in the 
United States has contributed to both increases in religious non-affiliation and, 
paradoxically, declines in the individual-level, positive effect of higher education 
on religious non-affiliation. Greater levels of college education have contributed 
to growth in non-affiliation by promoting a social context that is characteristic of 
what Taylor (2007) refers to as a “secular age,” and this social context influ ences 
people of all levels of education. At the same time, changes in the college-edu-
cated and non-college-educated segments of the population, and the diffusion of 
behaviors from the highly educated to the rest of the population, should have led 
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to a decline in the positive effect of higher education on religious non-affili ation. 
In particular, I argue that the relationship between college education and reli-
gious non-affiliation has declined across birth cohorts, and that this decline in the 
effect of education is associated with aggregate increases in education. I use hier-
archical age-period-cohort models (Yang and Land 2006) and repeated cross-sec-
tional survey data collected between 1973 and 2010 to test these propositions. Ad-
ditional analyses examine differences between those with a bachelor’s degree and 
a graduate degree, alternative measures of lack of participation in organized reli-
gion that incorporate both religious non-affiliation and abstaining from reli gious 
service attendance, and the impact of religious upbringing on changes in the as-
sociation between higher education and religious non-affiliation.
Why the Effect of College Education Should Have Changed
Changes in the College-Educated Population
Social scientists posit three primary reasons why higher education leads to 
disaffili ation from religion. First, some researchers suggest that there is a conflict 
between what is taught in colleges and universities and the content of certain re-
ligious beliefs (e.g., Beckwith 1985; Johnson 1997; Stark 1963). This “conflicting 
worldviews” argument emphasizes that higher education focuses on knowledge, 
learning, and science, while religion focuses on mystery and revelation (Miller 
1967), and these are seen as incompatible approaches to the world (Halman and 
Draulans 2006), particularly in the conservative Protestant community (Evans 
2013). Second, since social networks provide much of the impetus for religious 
practice and affilia tion (Cheadle and Schwadel 2012; Cornwall 1989; Iannaccone 
1994), changes in social networks associated with higher education can lead to re-
ligious disaffiliation (Baker and Smith 2009; Maryl and Uecker 2011; Smith and 
Snell 2009). It is not just the initial change in social networks that accompanies 
the traditional move from high school to college, but also the different social net-
works available to the college-educated through the family, workplace, neigh-
borhoods, and voluntary organizations (Marsden 1987). Third, higher education 
may act as a proxy for cultural capital, and those with high levels of cultural capi-
tal are disproportion ately predisposed to religious non-affiliation (Wuthnow and 
Mellinger 1978). The cultural capital argument proposes that Americans who at-
tend college come from high-capital homes, and these elite origins drive the asso-
ciation between higher education and religious non-affiliation (Wilson and Sher-
kat 1994).
The college-educated population, however, has changed considerably in re-
cent generations as higher education has expanded. In 1970, only about a fifth of 
American adults had at least one year of college; by 2006, more than half of Amer-
icans had attended college for at least one year (US Census Bureau 2007). Varia-
tions in education generally occur across birth cohorts (Lauderdale 2001). Among 
younger birth cohorts, then, college education is the norm in many com munities, 
rather than a privilege for the select few. This growth in higher edu cation has 
little direct bearing on the conflicting worldviews argument, though researchers 
suggest that compartmentalization (e.g., Clydesdale 2007) and denominational 
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diversity (e.g., Stark and Finke 2000; Warner 1993) mitigate conflicts between re-
ligious beliefs and the content of higher education in the con temporary United 
States. On the other hand, intergenerational growth in higher education largely 
invalidates the social networks and cultural capital arguments.
As college education has become more widespread, it can no longer serve 
to distinguish between those with greater and lesser amounts of cultural cap-
ital, between those who are and are not disproportionately predisposed to re-
ligious decline. In support of this perspective, while older research generally 
found that students exhibit large declines in religiosity while in college (e.g., 
Feldman 1969), recent research suggests that college students do not report par-
ticularly low lev els of religious belief (e.g., Hill 2011). In fact, contemporary col-
lege students are more likely to report a strengthening of religious faith than a 
weakening of faith during their college years (Lee 2002) and, most importantly, 
they are relatively likely to be affiliated with a religion (Uecker, Regnerus, and 
Vaaler 2007).
Similarly, if the social networks argument is valid, then the growth of higher 
education should lead to a decline in the effect of college education on religious 
non-affiliation. Even secular universities are now conducive to the practice of 
religion (Cherry, DeBerg, and Porterfield 2001; Sherkat 2007), with consider able 
opportunities for students to attain greater levels of education and maintain vi-
tal social relationships with religiously similar associates (Braskamp 2007; Perry 
and Armstrong 2007; Schmalzbauer 2007, 2013). The relevant changes are not 
limited to college campuses. Among younger generations, a large pro portion 
of contemporaries have college degrees. Consequently, religious com munities, 
both denominations (Wuthnow 1988) and congregations (Schwadel 2009), are 
now educationally diverse. Thus, college-educated religious affiliates are now 
less likely to be outliers in their own religious communities, and they are less 
likely to be disconnected from other religiously affiliated Americans because of 
their education. As Wuthnow (2007, 87, italics in original) notes in his analysis 
of post-baby-boomer religion, “The link that had once associ ated being nonre-
ligious with being better educated was now broken ... it was possible to be re-
ligious and educated, rather than feeling as inclined to become nonreligious if 
one was educated.”
Changes in the Non-College-Educated Population
Changes in the non-college-educated population further suggest 
disproportion ate increases in non-affiliation among those without a college de-
gree. Economic opportunities for Americans without a college education have 
declined consid erably in recent decades (Fischer and Hout 2006). This economic 
downturn has been accompanied by a decline in traditional family formation 
among less-educated segments of the population (Cherlin 2009). Wilcox et al. 
(2012) argue that these demographic changes have led to “religious deinstitution-
alization” among less-educated Americans in particular.
Americans without a college education may now feel alienated from religious 
organizations for a variety of reasons. As Wilcox et al. (2012) point out, the em-
phasis on familism in mainstream congregations (Edgell 2006), which once at-
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tracted less-educated Americans, now discourages attendance among those 
without a college education. The high levels of class diversity in contemporary 
congregations (Schwadel 2009) may also lead to religious deinstitutionaliza tion 
among the less educated. Americans with low levels of education often feel un-
comfortable in congregations with large numbers of middle- and upper-class at-
tendees (Schwadel 2012; Sullivan 2011), and therefore they may become less 
likely to affiliate. The religious deinstitutionalization of Americans without a col-
lege education is supported by recent research examining the effects of educa tion 
on religious participation (e.g., Schwadel 2011; Wilcox et al. 2012).
The Diffusion of Innovation
Along with changes among the college-educated and non-college-educated 
populations, the process of cultural diffusion should lead to intergenerational de-
clines in the effect of higher education on religious non-affiliation. Religious non-
affiliation is a key religious innovation (Tamney, Powell, and Johnson 1989), and 
cultural innovations often originate among the highly educated (Elias 2000). Since 
the highly educated are frequently “early adaptors” and “innovators” of cultural 
innovations (Rogers 2003), it is not surprising that they were relatively likely to 
have no affiliation when few Americans were unaffiliated.
As new behaviors become more established, however, they tend to diffuse 
to less-educated segments of population (Pampel and Hunter 2012; Young and 
Willmott 1973). This diffusion becomes a self-sustaining process once the new 
behavior reaches a certain threshold (Palloni 2001). Eventually, less-educated 
seg ments of the population should adopt these behaviors in large numbers. 
Rogers (2003) refers to the less educated as “laggards” in this process of cul-
tural diffu sion; and, as generational research emphasizes, this process is likely 
to manifest across birth cohorts (Edmunds and Turner 2002). In sum, various 
social pro cesses that involve changes among the college-educated, religious 
deinstitutional ization among those without a college degree, and cultural dif-
fusion from highly educated to less-educated segments of the population sug-
gest that the effect of higher education on religious non-affiliation has declined 
across generations.
Aggregate Association between Higher Education and Non-Affiliation
The preceding discussion focuses on declines in the individual-level, posi-
tive effect of higher education on religious non-affiliation, and is partially predi-
cated on the growth of higher education. Aggregate growth in higher education, 
however, may still be correlated with increases in religious non-affiliation. Tay-
lor (2007) argues that secularity in the United States manifests in widespread so-
cial acceptance of the right to choose to believe or not to believe, to affiliate or not 
to affiliate, and growth in higher education brings about societal changes that in-
fluence the choice to affili ate or not affiliate with a religion. For instance, regard-
less of an individual’s level of education, aggregate growth in education is asso-
ciated with greater political toler ance of the nonreligious (Schwadel and Garneau 
2014). Additionally, increases in higher education promote support for diverse 
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viewpoints (Williams, Nunn, and St. Peter 1976) and declines in religious author-
ity (Balswick, Ward, and Carlson 1975), which should also lead to greater social 
acceptance of religious non-affiliation. Consequently, growth in college educa-
tion may explain some of the period-based increases in religious non-affiliation 
(Schwadel 2010), while the influence of college education on an individual’s deci-
sion to disaffiliate declines across birth cohorts.
Primary Hypotheses
The individual and aggregate trends discussed above suggest four primary 
hypotheses. First, changes in cultural capital and access to religious-based so-
cial networks among the college-educated, as well as the diffusion of behav-
iors from highly educated to less-educated segments of the population, sug-
gest Hypothesis 1: The positive effect of bachelor’s degree on religious non-affiliation 
declines across birth cohorts. Second, along with changes in the college-educated 
popu lation, the religious deinstitutionalization of the non-college-educated 
suggests Hypothesis 2: Those without a bachelor’s degree are the most likely to re­
port no affiliation in the youngest birth cohorts. Third, social and cultural changes 
associated with aggregate growth in higher education suggest Hypothe­
sis 3: Aggregate (period and/or birth cohort) growth in the proportion of the pop­
ulation with a bachelor’s degree is positively associated with non-affiliation. Fourth, 
changes in the population of college-educated Americans that accom pany ag-
gregate growth in higher education suggest Hypothesis 4: The decline in the pos­
itive effect of bachelor’s degree on non-affiliation is associated with aggregate (cohort) 
growth in higher education.
Additional Considerations: Post-Bachelor’s Education, Religious 
Participation, and Religious Tradition of Origin
The above hypotheses do not directly address the role of a post-bachelor’s 
edu cation. Though little contemporary research focuses specifically on the effects 
of a post-bachelor’s education, Tamney, Powell, and Johnson’s (1989) analysis 
of aggregated data from 1973 to 1985 shows almost no difference in non-affilia-
tion between those with a bachelor’s degree and those with a graduate degree. 
Changes in the college-educated population discussed above, however, may not 
apply to those with a graduate degree. To address this possibility, I present addi-
tional analyses that examine intergenerational changes in the effects of both bach-
elor’s degree and post-bachelor’s degree on religious non-affiliation.
I incorporate religious service into the analyses to address alternative ways of 
conceptualizing abstaining from organized religion. It is important to note that 
religious non-affiliation is not always accompanied by not attending religious ser-
vices, and vice versa (Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam 2010). Grouping non-prac-
ticing affiliates with other religiously affiliated respondents may therefore bias 
the results, as may grouping practicing non-affiliates with other non-affil iated re-
spondents. Thus, I examine two alternative measures of lack of inter action with 
organized religion: either reporting no religious affiliation or not attending reli-
Birth  Cohort  Changes  in  College  Educat ion and Rel ig ious  Non-Aff i l iat ion     7
gious services, which represents a much larger proportion of the population than 
non-affiliation alone, and both reporting no religious affiliation and not attending 
religious services, which represents the segment of the popula tion with little to 
no interaction with organized religion.
Finally, the religious tradition in which people are raised should influence 
changes in the association between education and religious non-affiliation. For 
instance, there has been considerable growth in being raised with no affilia tion 
(Schwadel 2010), and those raised with no affiliation are relatively likely to con-
tinue to have no affiliation in adulthood (Lim, MacGregor, and Putnam 2010). 
Additionally, the impact of education may be limited among evangeli cal Protes-
tants when the cultural influences of higher education and evangelical Protestant-
ism conflict with each other (McFarland, Wright, and Weakliem 2011; Schwadel 
2011; Vaisey 2008). Americans raised in evangelical Protestant homes are also rel-
atively unlikely to disaffiliate (Wilson and Sherkat 1994). I address the influence 
of religious origin by presenting separate models for respondents raised with any 
affiliation, raised with no affiliation, raised evangelical Protestant, raised main-
line Protestant, raised black Protestant, and raised Catholic.
Data and Methods
I use 1973–2010 General Social Survey (GSS) data to examine the relationship 
between education and reporting no religious affiliation. The GSS is a nation-
ally representative survey of non-institutionalized American adults conducted 
annually or biennially since 1972 (Smith, Marsden, and Hout 2011). The GSS is 
generally administered in person, though some interviews are completed over 
the phone. Response rates vary between 70 and 80 percent.1 I limit the sample 
to the surveys conducted from 1973 to 2010 because the religious-origin mea-
sures were not included in the 1972 survey. Respondents who are less than 25 
years old are removed from the sample to avoid limiting variation in education, 
and to be consistent with previous research on religious non-affiliation (e.g., 
Hout and Fischer 2002). Respondents born before 1900 and after 1979 are de-
leted from the sample due to the small number of cases in those birth cohorts. 
The final sample size is 38,251.2
Dependent Variables
Respondents were asked, “What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?” The primary dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable, coded zero for respondents who answer Prot-
estant, Catholic, Jewish, or some other religion, and one for respondents who re-
port no religion. Additional analyses combine the no-affiliation measure with a 
measure of frequency of religious service attendance to explore lack of attach-
ment to organized religion more broadly. Specifically, I use two additional di-
chotomous dependent variables: one that indicates no affiliation and no ser vice 
attendance, and one that indicates no affiliation or no service attendance. Cohort-
specific means for all level-one variables are reported in table 1. 
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As figure 1a shows, the percent reporting no affiliation grew considerably from 
1973 to 2010, for both the college- and non-college-educated. The dif ference be-
tween those with and without a bachelor’s degree declined in the late 1990s, but 
then increased again in the early 2000s. Conversely, the gross cohort changes 
shown in figure 1b suggest that those without a bachelor’s are the most likely 
to have no affiliation in younger cohorts. However, since age has a large effect 
on non-affiliation (Schwadel 2010), these gross cohort differences should not be 
taken as definitive evidence of an across-cohort reversal of the effect of education 
on non-affiliation.
Figure 1. Gross time (survey year) and birth cohort changes in no religious affiliation. Sample lim-
ited to respondents at least 25 years of age; N = 38,251. 
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Independent Variables
The key independent variables measure education, age, period, and birth co-
hort. Education is assessed with a dichotomous variable indicating respondents 
with a bachelor’s degree. As table 1 shows, there is considerable across-cohort 
growth in the likelihood of having a bachelor’s degree. Alternative models split 
the bach elor’s degree variable into two dichotomous variables: bachelor’s degree 
only and post-bachelor’s degree. Age is measured in years of age, centered on the 
mean of age. Preliminary analyses show no nonlinear age effects. Each survey 
year is treated as a single period, and birth cohorts are coded into five-year inter-
vals (1900–1904 to 1975–79). Period and cohort means of bachelor’s degree are 
used to assess aggregate changes in education.
Religious tradition of origin is coded according to the religious tradition clas-
sification scheme developed by Steensland et al. (2000). The religious-origin vari-
ables are based on survey questions that ask respondents about their reli gious 
affiliation when they were 16 years old. The resulting categories are raised any 
affiliation, raised mainline Protestant, raised evangelical Protestant (i.e., conser-
vative Protestant), raised Catholic, raised black Protestant, raised Jewish, raised 
in “other” religions, and raised with no religious affiliation. I present tra dition-
specific models to explore how the effect of education varies by religious origin, 
though there are no tradition-specific models for those raised Jewish or in “other” 
religions, due to small numbers of respondents in those groups. The religious-or-
igin variables are also used as control variables in models employing all respon-
dents and all affiliated respondents. Additionally, all models include controls for 
sex, marital status, children in the home, family income, urbanity, region, and 
race.3
Analysis Technique
Although there is currently no general solution to the linear dependency 
among measures of age, period, and cohort (Glenn 2005), recent methodologi-
cal advances advocate hierarchical or multilevel models to adjust for this linear 
dependency problem when using repeated cross-sectional data (Yang and Land 
2006, 2008). Hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models adjust for the de-
pendency between age, period (year of survey), and birth cohort by treat ing co-
horts and periods as cross-classified level-two units in a multilevel model (Yang 
and Land 2006).4 Individuals are the level-one unit of analysis. With this tech-
nique, individuals are nested in cohort-by-period cells. Random period and co-
hort intercepts establish variation from the mean for each period and cohort 
(Yang and Land 2006). Variance components for the education coefficient spec-
ify variation from the overall slope of education for each period and cohort. In 
conjunction with the main effect of education, period-specific and cohort-spe-
cific variations in the slope of education are used to estimate the effect of edu-
cation separately for each period and cohort. Period- and cohort-level mea sures 
of education (i.e., mean with a bachelor’s degree) are added to the model to ad-
dress the role of aggregate increases in education. Cross-level interactions (indi-
vidual education * average period- and cohort-level education) test whether the 
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impact of education on religious non-affiliation varies with mean levels of edu-
cation in birth cohorts and time periods.
HAPC models are more statistically efficient than fixed-effects models when 
using unbalanced data that contain an unequal number of respondents in the 
cohort-by-period cells, which is the case in the GSS data (Yang and Land 2008). 
A logit link function adjusts for the dichotomous dependent variable. Conse-
quently, the models report results in logged odds, similar to logistic regres sion. 
The results are converted into odds ratios in the text, in table 3, and in figures 2 
through 6. Odds ratios above one indicate a positive effect, and odds ratios be-
low one indicate a negative effect. All analyses are conducted in HLM 7. Unfor-
tunately, the approximation methods used in computing the models do not pro-
duce a reliable deviance statistic or measure of model fit (Snijders and Bosker 
1999). All analyses are weighted.
Results
Changing Effect of a Bachelor’s Degree
Results from HAPC models of religious non-affiliation are shown in models 
1 through 5 in table 2. The top portion of the table reports fixed effects in logged 
odds. The bottom portion of the table reports variance components that rep resent 
the amount of variation in both non-affiliation (intercept) and the slope of educa-
tion across level-two units. Random effects results in model 1 show considerably 
more period-based variation (variance component = .139) than cohort-based vari-
ation (variance component = .022) in religious non-affiliation. The fixed-effects re-
sults show that age has a robust, negative effect on non-affiliation. Both changes 
in non-affiliation across time periods and the negative effect of age comport with 
previous age-period-cohort research on non-affilia tion (e.g., Schwadel 2010). As 
expected, bachelor’s degree has a strong, positive effect on reporting no religious 
affiliation. All else being equal, attaining a bach elor’s degree is associated with a 
34 percent (e.29 = 1.34; 1.34 – 1 = .34) increase in the odds of reporting no religious 
affiliation. Across the cumulative GSS, edu cation, but not family income, is posi-
tively related to religious non-affiliation.
Testing the primary argument—that the effect of higher education declines 
across birth cohorts—model 2 adds random slopes for bachelor’s degree. The 
bachelor’s degree period variance component (.006) is small and not significant. 
Conversely, the bachelor’s degree cohort variance component (.199) is large and 
significant, indicating that the effect of bachelor’s degree varies across birth co-
horts. This variation is depicted in figure 2, which reports cohort-specific odds ra-
tios for the bachelor’s degree variable. As figure 2 shows, having a bachelor’s de-
gree is strongly and positively associated with reporting no religious affiliation 
for members of the oldest birth cohort, born between 1900 and 1904, but the pos-
itive effect of a bachelor’s degree is largest for the 1920–24 cohort. Among Amer-
icans born in the first half of the 1920s, the odds of reporting no reli gious affil-
iation are 186 percent greater for those with a bachelor’s degree than for those 
without a bachelor’s degree (odds ratio = 2.86). The positive effect of a college ed-
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ucation is smaller but still large for 
most of the 1930s and 1940s cohorts, 
with odds ratios over 1.5 for all co-
horts except the 1935–39 cohort. The 
effect of a college degree is smaller 
still for the 1950s cohorts (odds ra-
tios = 1.28 and 1.17). By the 1965–
69 cohort, college education has no 
effect (odds ratio = 1.00). Among 
members of the 1970–74 birth co-
hort, having a bachelor’s degree 
is associated with a 40 percent de­
cline in the odds of reporting no re-
ligious affiliation (odds ratio = .60; 
.60 – 1 = –.40). This negative effect 
is reduced but still relevant for the 
1975–79 cohort (odds ratio = .82). 
Overall, these results show that the 
positive effect of a college degree 
on religious non-affiliation declines 
across cohorts, from those born in 
the 1920s through those born in the 
1960s. Notably, college education is 
negatively associated with religious 
non-affiliation for the 1970s cohorts.
Aggregate College Education
I proposed that aggregate lev-
els of education are both associated 
with non-affiliation and partially 
drive the decline in the positive, 
individ ual-level effect of education 
on non-affiliation. Models 3 and 4 in 
table 2 test these propositions. Re-
sults from model 3 show that both 
mean cohort bachelor’s degree (b = 
3.41) and mean period bachelor’s 
degree (b = 4.24) have significant, 
positive effects on reporting no re-
ligious affiliation, indicating that 
growth in college edu cation across 
time periods and birth cohorts is 
correlated with reporting no reli-
gious affiliation. Additionally, there 
is a considerable decline in the vari-
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ance components for both the period intercept (.110 in model 2 to .028 in model 3) 
and cohort intercept (.051 in model 2 to .016 in model 3) with the addition of ag-
gregate measures of education to the model. In other words, aggregate increases 
in higher educa tion appear to explain much of the period and cohort changes in 
reporting no religious affiliation.
Model 4 includes cross-level interaction terms between individual and aggre-
gate measures of education. The results show that the addition of cross-level in-
teractions leads to a large decline in the estimated across-cohort variation in the 
effect of a bachelor’s degree on non-affiliation (variance component of .162 in 
model 3 reduced to .064 in model 4). The interaction between individual bache-
lor’s degree and mean cohort bachelor’s degree is large and significant (b = –5.49), 
which means the positive effect of a bachelor’s degree declines as the cohort 
mean with a college education increases. These results support the proposition 
that across-cohort declines in the positive effect of education on religious non-
affilia tion are correlated with aggregate, across-cohort increases in education.
Post-Bachelor’s Degree
Turning to differences among the college-educated, model 5 in table 2 in-
cludes two dummy variables for higher education: bachelor’s degree only and 
post-bachelor’s degree. The coefficients demonstrate that, in the aggregate, those 
with a bachelor’s and those with a post-bachelor’s degree are both more likely 
than those without a bachelor’s degree to report no religious affiliation, though 
the odds ratio for post-bachelor’s (1.67) is larger than the odds ratio for bachelor’s 
only (1.38). The variance components indicate that the effects of both bachelor’s 
Figure 2. Cohort-specific odds ratios for bachelor’s degree from hierarchical age-period-cohort 
model of no religious affiliation. Figure graphs results from model 2 in table 2. 
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degree and post-bachelor’s degree vary significantly across birth cohorts. As fig-
ure 3 shows, the positive effects of bachelor’s degree and post-bachelor’s degree 
decline across cohorts. Notably, though, there is no negative effect of post-bache-
lor’s degree in the youngest cohorts. Among the 1970s cohorts, respondents with-
out a bachelor’s degree and those with a post-bachelor’s degree are about equally 
likely to report no affiliation, while those with only a bachelor’s degree are rela-
tively unlikely to report no affiliation. Overall, these results demonstrate that the 
decline in the effect of higher education on religious non-affiliation extends to 
those with a post-bachelor’s degree, but the negative effect of college education in 
the youngest cohorts does not hold for those with a post-bachelor’s degree.
Non-Affiliation and/or No Attendance
The final two models in table 2 incorporate religious service attendance into 
the measure of no religious affiliation. The dependent variable in model 6 is re-
porting no religious affiliation or never attending religious services. Bachelor’s 
degree has a moderate, negative effect on the measure of no affiliation or no at-
tendance (odds ratio = .85), and this effect varies significantly across birth cohorts 
(variance com ponent = .037). As the dashed line in figure 4 shows, bachelor’s de-
gree has little impact on no affiliation or no attendance in older cohorts (i.e., odds 
ratios near 1), while in younger cohorts, bachelor’s degree has a strong, negative 
effect on no affiliation or no attendance (e.g., odds ratio of .70 for 1975–79 cohort).
The dependent variable in model 7 in table 2 is no affiliation and no atten dance. 
Bachelor’s degree has a positive effect (odds ratio = 1.42), but this effect varies 
considerably across cohorts (variance component = .252). As the solid line in fig-
ure 4 shows, bachelor’s degree has a strong, positive effect on no affiliation and 
Figure 3. Cohort-specific odds ratios for bachelor’s degree (only) and post-bachelor’s degree from 
hierarchical age-period-cohort model of no religious affiliation. Figure graphs results from model 5 
in table 2. 
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no attendance in older cohorts, with odds ratios near or above 2 for all pre-1930 
cohorts. This effect reverses direction across birth cohorts. In younger cohorts, 
bachelor’s degree has a negative effect (e.g., odds ratios between .74 and .75 for 
those born between 1965 and 1979). Overall, these results suggest that in older 
cohorts the college-educated are relatively likely to exhibit intense forms of lack 
of interaction with organized religion (i.e., no affiliation and no attendance), but 
in younger cohorts, it is those without a college degree who are the most likely 
to lack interaction with organized religion, regardless of how that interaction is 
measured (i.e., no affiliation and/or no attendance).
Religious Origin
Table 3 reports results from HAPC models of no religious affiliation by reli-
gious origin. These models replicate model 2 in table 2 but limit the sample by 
the reli gious tradition in which respondents were raised. Among those raised 
with any religious affiliation, bachelor’s degree has a positive effect on religious 
disaffili ation (odds ratio = 1.43), and there is substantial across-cohort variation 
in the effect of bachelor’s degree (variance component = .148). This variation is 
repre sented by the solid line in figure 5, which depicts a large, across-cohort de-
cline in the effect of bachelor’s degree on religious disaffiliation. The odds ra-
tio for bach elor’s degree decreases from 2.45 for the 1920–24 cohort to .72 for the 
1970–74 cohort. There is little difference between across-cohort changes in the ef-
fect of education among all respondents and among those raised with a religious 
affili ation, suggesting that the increase in the number of Americans raised with 
no religion is not unduly influencing the results. Additionally, the raised unaffili-
ated model in table 3 shows that the effect of bachelor’s degree follows a similar 
Figure 4. Cohort-specific odds ratios for bachelor’s degree from hierarchical age-period-cohort 
models of no religious affiliation and/or no religious service attendance. Figure graphs results from 
models 6 and 7 in table 2. 
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pattern for those raised with no affiliation (see figure 5).5 One notable difference 
is that the negative effect of bachelor’s degree among the 1970s cohorts is more 
robust for those raised unaffiliated.
For those raised evangelical Protestant, the overall effect of education is small 
and not significant (odds ratio = 1.09). Nonetheless, the effect of bachelor’s de-
gree varies considerably across birth cohorts (variance component = .231). As fig-
ure 6 shows, bachelor’s degree has little or no effect for the oldest cohorts raised 
evangelical, but a strong, positive effect for the 1920–24 cohort and the 1930s and 
1940s cohorts. The effect of bachelor’s degree is negative for both the 1950s and 
1970s cohorts of respondents raised evangelical Protestant.
The results in table 3 also show considerable change in the effect of bach elor’s 
degree (odds ratio = 1.64) across cohorts of Americans raised mainline Protestant 
(variance component = .152). As figure 6 shows, there is a relatively linear, across-
cohort decline in the effect of bachelor’s degree for those raised mainline Protes-
tant, from the 1915–19 cohort (odds ratio = 3.23) to the 1950–54 cohort (odds ratio 
= 1.00). In contrast to the raised evangelical Protestant model, there is no negative 
association between bachelor’s degree and disaffilia tion among any of the cohorts 
raised mainline Protestant.
The raised Catholic findings (table 3 and figure 6) are similar to the raised 
mainline Protestant findings. Specifically, bachelor’s degree has a strong, posi-
tive effect on disaffiliation among older cohorts (e.g., odds ratios near or above 
2 for all pre-1940 cohorts), and this effect declines across cohorts (e.g., odds ratio 
of 1.05 for 1970–74 cohort). Finally, bachelor’s degree is not meaningfully associ-
ated with disaffiliation for respondents raised black Protestant, and this associa-
tion does not change significantly across periods or cohorts. In sum, the results in 
Figure 5. Cohort-specific odds ratios for bachelor’s degree for respondents raised with a religious 
affiliation and respondents raised without a religious affiliation from hierarchical age-period-cohort 
models of no religious affiliation. Figure graphs results from models in table 3. 
Birth  Cohort  Changes  in  College  Educat ion and Rel ig ious  Non-Aff i l iat ion     21
table 3, depicted in figures 5 and 6, suggest that across-cohort declines in the pos-
itive effect of bachelor’s degree on non-affiliation occur among those raised main-
line Protestant, evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and with no affilia tion, but the 
negative effect of bachelor’s degree in younger cohorts is limited to those raised 
evangelical Protestant and unaffiliated.
Discussion and Conclusions
To summarize, I use repeated cross-sectional survey data from 1973 to 2010 
to examine changes in the relationship between college education and report-
ing no religious affiliation. Age-period-cohort models show that the strong, posi-
tive effect of a college education on religious non-affiliation declines across birth 
cohorts, so there is no association between higher education and non-affilia tion 
by the 1965–69 cohort. This finding supports the first hypothesis. It also fits with 
expectations from a cultural diffusion model (Palloni 2001; Pampel and Hunter 
2012; Rogers 2003), which suggests that religious innovations that begin dispro-
portionately among the highly educated eventually diffuse to the remainder of 
the population. While cultural diffusion is not easy to directly address through 
survey-based research, extending the above analyses to incor porate international 
samples could provide additional evidence.
Among Americans born in the 1970s, college education has a negative ef-
fect on non-affiliation. This finding supports the second hypothesis, as well as 
proposi tions regarding religious deinstitutionalization among the less educated 
(Wilcox et al. 2012). The religious deinstitutionalization of the non-college-edu-
cated is further supported by models that incorporate religious attendance into 
the mea sure of non-affiliation. In younger cohorts, a large minority of Amer-
Figure 6. Cohort-specific odds ratios for bachelor’s degree for respondents raised Protestant and 
Catholic from hierarchical age-period-cohort models of no religious affiliation. Figure graphs results 
from models in table 3. 
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icans report either not attending services or no religious affiliation (see table 
1), and in those same cohorts, the non-college-educated are particularly likely 
to report either no attendance or no affiliation. At the more extreme end of re-
ligious deinstitu tionalization, both having no affiliation and not attending ser-
vices is relatively rare. Still, for those born between 1965 and 1979, the non-col-
lege-educated are disproportionately likely to report both no affiliation and no 
service attendance. These results extend Wilcox et al.’s (2012) analysis of service 
attendance by demonstrating that the religious deinstitutionalization of non-
college-educated Americans involves both affiliation and service attendance, 
and it occurs across birth cohorts.
The absence of an association between higher education and non-affiliation for 
the 1965–69 cohort and the negative association for the 1970s cohorts have im-
plications beyond affiliation with organized religion. Americans who matured 
in the 1960s and later are the motivation for what Wuthnow (1976) calls a “con-
sciousness reformation” and what Bellah et al. (1985) call “Sheilaism”—world-
views that emphasize religious individualism and an aversion to traditional 
forms of organized of religion. Wuthnow, Bellah et al., and others who explore 
the cultural changes brought about since the 1960s suggest that education is pos-
itively related to this new frame of mind. Yet education does not positively af-
fect religious disaffiliation for Americans born after the 1950s. This across-cohort 
change in the association between education and religious disaffiliation may ap-
ply to other forms of religious individualism and aversion to religious author-
ity, or even to other cohort-appropriate cultural changes such as views of gender, 
race, and sexual orientation.
With regard to aggregate levels of education, the average level of educa tion in 
both periods and birth cohorts is positively associated with religious non-affili-
ation. As higher education becomes more common, so does religious non-affili-
ation, regardless of an individual’s level of education. This finding sup ports the 
third hypothesis, and it comports with Taylor’s (2007) emphasis on the spread of 
“secular age” culture. The growth of higher education does not just affect those 
with a college education. Instead, increases in higher education bring about social 
and cultural changes that influence Americans in general. For instance, growth 
in political tolerance of the nonreligious—which is associated with aggregate in-
creases in education—should lead to greater social acceptance of religious non-
affiliation across the educational continuum (Schwadel and Garneau 2014). The 
above results are an important reminder that both indi vidual and aggregate phe-
nomena are relevant to social change.
The results also show that the positive effect of college education on reli gious 
non-affiliation declines as the proportion of cohort members with a col lege edu-
cation increases. This finding supports the fourth hypothesis, and it aligns with 
changes in the college-educated population. In younger genera tions, college ed-
ucation is not limited to those with relatively high levels of cul tural capital who 
are disproportionately predisposed to religious disaffiliation (Wilson and Sher-
kat 1994; Wuthnow and Mellinger 1978). Additionally, the growth of higher ed-
ucation has created a more diverse pool of college gradu ates who are not as so-
cially isolated from religious-based social networks that are key to maintaining 
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religious affiliation (Baker and Smith 2009; Cheadle and Schwadel 2012; Maryl 
and Uecker 2011). Simply put, what it means to be a college-educated American 
has changed, and this likely influences estab lished correlates of higher education, 
such as non-affiliation. Still, additional research is needed to more directly ex-
amine these proposed forms of social change, particularly how social networks 
and cultural capital vary across cohorts of college-educated Americans, and how 
these changes influence reli gious behaviors and other correlates of higher educa-
tion. Further research is also needed to examine the impact of different types of 
educational institu tions. It is possible that changes in the association between ed-
ucation and reli gious non-affiliation differ for those who attend religious and sec-
ular schools, and for those who attend elite, private universities and those who 
attend pub lic universities (Hill 2011).
American religion has changed substantially in recent decades, as the pro-
portion of the population raised with no religion has increased considerably 
(Schwadel 2010). Americans who were born in the 1960s and 1970s and raised 
unaffiliated are relatively unlikely to attain a bachelor’s degree (Massengill and 
MacGregor 2012), which suggests that the decline in the positive association be-
tween college education and non-affiliation may be affected by those raised with 
no affiliation. Nonetheless, the above results show that across-cohort changes in 
the association between higher education and religious non-affilia tion are rele-
vant for both Americans with secular origins and those raised with a religious af-
filiation. In other words, there is a decline in the positive effect of college educa-
tion on religious disaffiliation. In contrast to popular discourse, higher education is 
not associated with apostasy or the renunciation of orga nized religion for Ameri-
cans born since the 1960s.
As expected, across-cohort changes in the effect of higher education on reli-
gious non-affiliation vary by religious origin. Among both Catholics and main-
line Protestants, college education has a strong, positive effect on disaffilia-
tion in older cohorts, and this effect declines across cohorts. Among evangelical 
Protestants, college education has a strong, positive effect on disaffiliation for 
most cohorts born between 1920 and 1949, but a negative effect for the 1950s 
and 1970s cohorts. Averaging the effects for the two 1970s cohorts, a bachelor’s 
degree is associated with a 35 percent reduction in the odds of disaffiliation for 
those raised evangelical Protestant, a 23 percent increase in the odds of disaffili-
ation for those raised mainline Protestant, and a 15 percent increase in the odds 
of disaffiliation for those raised Catholic. Catholics and mainline Protestants in 
younger cohorts continue to fit the traditional model of being relatively likely to 
disaffiliate if they attain a bachelor’s degree, though the magnitude of the asso-
ciation is considerably smaller than in older cohorts. Among evangelical Prot-
estants in younger cohorts, however, it is the less educated that are particu larly 
likely to become apostates.
These results suggest that the religious deinstitutionalization of non-college-
educated Americans emphasized by Wilcox et al. (2012) is disproportionately evi-
dent among evangelical Protestants. Although the evangelical Protestant commu-
nity has generally been relatively successful at transmitting religious affiliation 
across generations by limiting disaffiliation (Wilson and Sherkat 1994), this ca-
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pacity has waned for the non-college-educated. One potential explanation for 
this change is the value placed on college-educated adherents in contemporary 
evangelical churches (McFarland, Wright, and Weakliem 2011). As evangelical 
churches become more welcoming to the highly educated, those with low lev-
els of education may become increasingly uncomfortable in their churches (Schw-
adel 2012), leading to greater rates of disaffiliation among less-educated evangel-
ical Protestants. A qualitative approach to why non-college-educated evangelical 
Protestants from younger cohorts are relatively likely to disaffiliate would be a 
fruitful extension to the above results (e.g., Sullivan 2011). Regardless of the rea-
son for this finding, it is clear that as evangelical Protestant churches have gained 
in their relative social class (Schwadel 2014), they are having trouble retaining 
less-educated adherents.
In conclusion, secularization theories predict that higher education leads to de-
clines in participation in organized religion (e.g., Beckwith 1985; Johnson 1997; 
Swatos and Christiano 1999), and this view was supported by the posi tive asso-
ciation between education and religious disaffiliation. The doubling of the pro-
portion of Americans with no religious affiliation in the 1990s further fed the de-
bate over secularization and the decline of religion (e.g., Hout and Fischer 2003; 
Marwell and Demerath 2003). The above findings, however, run counter to the 
assumption that education continues to have a secularizing influ ence, at least in 
terms of religious disaffiliation. Of course, secularization is a multifaceted con-
cept. The findings in this article do not address other prominent secularization 
predictions, such as the waning influence of religious authority or the differenti-
ation of religious and nonreligious institutions in modern societies (Gorski 2000). 
The growth of disaffiliation itself is probably evidence of secu larization (Marwell 
and Demerath 2003), but individuals’ education is not—or is no longer—respon-
sible for this manifestation of secularization.
Notes
1. Response rates based on response rate 5 (American Association for Public Opinion 
Research 2008). See GSS, appendix A, for more information on sampling.
2. About half of the missing cases are due to non-response on the family income ques-
tion. The results are unaffected when using a larger sample by excluding the income 
measure from the models. Unfortunately, HLM 7 does not allow for multiple impu-
tation of missing data with cross-classified models, and the estimation of random 
slopes becomes unstable in other statistical software packages, such as Stata.
3. Sex is assessed with a dummy variable for female respondents. Marital status is a 
dummy variable for married respondents. Children in the home is a dummy vari able 
for respondents with children below 18 years old living in their homes. Income is real 
family income in 1986 dollars, logged to limit heteroscedasticity. Three dummy vari-
ables account for city size: 100 largest SMSAs, suburbs of the 100 largest SMSAs, and 
rural areas; other urban (counties with towns of 10,000 people or more) is the refer-
ence category. A dummy variable for respondents in the South Census Region con-
trols for geographic variability. Dummy variables for African American and other 
non-white respondents control for race, with white as the refer ence category. 
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4. Since there is no general solution to the linear dependency problem, there is a vibrant 
debate over the utility of age-period-cohort models. Most of the recent debate has fo-
cused on Intrinsic Estimator models (see Demography 50(6), 2013), rather than HAPC 
models (cf. Bell and Jones 2014; Frenk, Yang, and Land 2013). While this debate has 
not yet addressed random slopes, which are the focus of the analysis in the article, it 
is possible that the coding of period and cohort may influence the results. To address 
this possibility, the analysis in this article was repeated with sev eral alternative cod-
ings of age, period, and cohort (not shown). For instance, in addition to the five-year 
cohorts, one-year periods, and continuous measure of age used in this article, I ran 
models with two-year periods, eight-year periods, four-year cohorts, ten-year cohorts, 
and dummy variables for five-year age groups. The results are robust to all these al-
ternative codings of age, period, and cohort. The results are also similar when the pri-
mary independent variable is years of education rather than bachelor’s degree.
5. The spike for the 1920–24 cohort is likely related to the relatively low number of re-
spondents raised with no affiliation in that cohort (see table 1). Relatedly, the low 
number of respondents raised unaffiliated in the oldest cohorts led to the removal of 
the 1900–1909 cohorts from the model limited to raised unaffiliated respondents.
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